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Abstract 
In this paper, we document the beneficial impact of firm level corporate governance practices 
on the riskiness of firms’ stock returns.  Using a self-constructed corporate governance index, 
we show that well-governed New Zealand firms experience lower levels of unsystematic risk, 
ceteris paribus.  In particular, our results show that corporate governance components such as 
board composition, shareholder rights, and disclosure practices are associated with lower 
levels of unsystematic risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Most studies on the economic impact of firm-level corporate governance have focused on 
attributes such as performance, cost of capital or stock price informativeness.  Few studies 
have examined the impact of corporate governance on risk. An exception is the recent work 
of Cheng (2008). In that study, he examines the impact of board size on the variability of 
corporate performance.  He finds that board size is negatively related to the variability of 
monthly stock returns, annual accounting return on  assets, Tobin’s Q, accounting accruals, 
extraordinary items, analyst forecast inaccuracy, the level of R&D expenditures, and the 
frequency of acquisition and restructuring activities. Board size is but one aspect of corporate 
governance. Arguably, other aspects of corporate governance should have a significant 
impact on the riskiness.  We therefore extend the work of Cheng (2008) by constructing a 
comprehensive index of firm level corporate governance and relate it to the risk of a firm’s 
stock return. The main contribution of our paper is to examine the basic premise that the 
aggregate firm level corporate governance should have a bearing on the riskiness of a firm.     
We believe that, investors are concerned not only about corporate performance but also 
about the variability in performance. We contribute to the literature by examining the impact 
of corporate governance features on variability of firm performance.  We extend the literature 
in two directions. First, while prior work (Cheng, 2008) has examined only one aspect of 
corporate governance, namely, board size, we consider a whole range of corporate 
governance features that are ostensibly relevant and study the impact on these on the 
variability of firm performance. As such, variability of firm performance constitutes a risk 
measure and therefore informs the debate on whether corporate governance can affect risk.    
Second, we provide external validation for the notion that good governance can reduce risk 
by studying a different market than the original study by Cheng (2008), viz., New Zealand.  
New Zealand is an OECD country that has adopted the best practices in corporate governance 
followed by other common law countries.    Since earlier has shown that institutional features 
are a major determinant of financial development at the country level and firm level access to 
external finance
1
, results obtained from New Zealand have implications for other OEC 
countries especially those under common law jurisdictions.  
Our empirical results show that our overall measure of corporate governance has 
no impact on risk as measured by standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted returns 
for New Zealand firms.  However, sub-indices based on board composition, shareholder 
rights, and disclosure policy significantly negatively influence risk.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
theoretical underpinnings that drive a relationship between specific corporate governance 
features and risk. Based on these, we develop a set of testable hypotheses that form the 
basis of our empirical tests.     In section 3, we describe our data and methodology.  Our 
empirical results are contained in section 4. Our conclusions are provided in the final 
section.  
2.0 Corporate Governance and Risk: Theoretical Underpinnings 
With the increasing attention being paid to corporate governance by investors, policy 
makers and other stakeholders, several information providers have begun to provide 
aggregate measures of corporate governance across firms.  For instance, RiskMetrics 
provides comprehensive information on corporate governance practices for thousands of 
firms operating in OECD countries. Lacking a comprehensive source of corporate 
governance for New Zealand firms, we created our own measure of corporate 
governance.  Our methodology for constructing firm-level corporate governance scores 
closely follows the system of McFarland (2002). A clear benefit of constructing our own 
governance indicator is that we are able to capture a wide variety of governance features 
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employed by firms.  A disadvantage of this approach is that the list of corporate 
governance features used and the weights assigned to each feature tend to be arbitrary.  
 As such, our overall corporate governance index encompasses four sub indices: (i) 
Board Composition, (ii) Shareholding and Compensation Policies, (iii) Shareholder 
Rights and Policies and (iv) Disclosure policies. Arguably, these corporate governance 
components should have an impact on the riskiness of a firm. We elaborate our 
motivation for using these components and the predicted impacts on risk below. 
 First, we construct the Board Composition sub index to capture board autonomy, 
structure and effectiveness.  Autonomy is measured by board independence, and by the 
independence of audit and compensation committees. This sub index also contains 
measures of board effectiveness, regularity of meetings and the separation of CEO/ Chair 
positions.  We argue that an effective board will prevent a firm from engaging in 
extremely risky investment and financial policies that jeopardize the future prospects of 
the firm.  We therefore argue that a higher score on the board composition sub index will 
be associated with a lower level of unsystematic risk of the firm’s stock returns.               
 Second, we compute the sub index of shareholding and compensation policies to 
measure the extent to which manager and the board members have incentives that align 
their interests with those of shareholders. Companies where the CEO and directors are 
required to take equity positions are given higher scores in constructing this sub index. 
Companies that give subsidized loans to managers are scored lower in this sub index.  
The impact of shareholding and compensation policies on unsystematic risk is unclear.  
On the one hand managers and board members are expected to behave like shareholders 
in avoiding policies that increase the risk of the firm.  On the other hand, the non-linearity 
underlying option packages implies that managers are not exposed to the same level of 
downside risk as outside shareholders. Thus they have incentives to engage in high risk 
investments in hopes of getting very high returns.  Thus the resultant impact of 
shareholding and compensation policies on risk is an empirical issue.  
 Third, we measure shareholder rights based on the existence of dilutive employee 
stock options and the presence of subordinate shares. These features reduce shareholder 
rights vis-a-vis managers. As such, firms with high scores on this sub index are deemed to 
investor friendly.  The negative effects of the existence of dilutive stock options and 
subordinate shares will exacerbate poor performance of the firm under condition of 
economic stress. As such, we expect a negative relationship between shareholder rights 
sub index and unsystematic risk.  
 The final sub index deals with disclosure policies.  Companies that comply with the 
best practices stipulated by the regulatory bodies in terms of disclosing their corporate 
governance practices, other relevant details of their directors, auditor compensation, list 
of other boards on which directors sit, and attendance records of board members score 
higher on this sub index. Good disclosure policies attenuate the information risk faced by 
investors. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between disclosure policy scores and 
unsystematic risk of the firm.          
 We use the hypotheses developed in this section to conduct empirical tests, the results 
of which are reported in section 4.          
3.0 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
We construct a corporate governance index for New Zealand firms based on four sub-
indices – board compensation, compensation policy, shareholder rights, and disclosure 
policy.  The aggregate index is created by summing up the value of the four sub-indices for 
each firm.  The criteria used for creating each of the sub-indices are similar to those of 
McFarland (2002) and is fully described in Klein et. al. (2005).   The board composition sub-
index measures board independence, CEO duality, busyness of directors and the number of 
annual board meetings.  The compensation policy sub-index is based on directors’ share 
ownership and option plans.  As such, this index captures the alignment of directors’ interests 
with those of shareholders.  The shareholder rights sub-index is based on dilutive features in 
option plans and voting rights and the presence of staggered boards.    The disclosure sub-
index measures the firms’ commitment to disclose information regarding their corporate 
governance practices.    We describe the detailed scoring scheme in the Appendix.  
 We collect financial data and corporate governance information from annual reports 
of firms listed in New Zealand from the NZX Deep Archive database for the 2004 to 2008 
period. Price data is sourced from Datastream. After deleting firms for which we have no 
financial data, we have a final sample of 385 firm year observations.  
 We provide summary statistics and correlation matrices for the sample in Tables 1 
and 2. In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for the aggregate governance index and its 
components.  In Table 2, we present   descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for 
selected variables.  The average score of the aggregate corporate governance index (CGI) is 
65.40 for our sample firms.  This is about five points higher than that of the Canadian sample 
documented in Klein et. al. (2005).  The average score of the board sub-index is 21.55 for our 
sample firms.  This is about four points lower than that of the Canadian sample.  The average 
score of the compensation sub-index (Comp) is 12.65 for our sample firms.  This is about the 
same for the Canadian sample reported in Klein et. al. (2005).  The average score of the rights 
sub-index is 19.44 for our sample firms.  This is about 2.5 points higher than the Canadian 
sample.  Finally, the disclosure sub-index averages 11.76 for our sample as compared to 6.41 
for the Canadian sample of Klein et. al (2005).  Overall our descriptive statistics indicate that 
New Zealand firms display higher corporate governance scores due to better scores on the 
rights and disclosure sub-indices as compared to Canadian firms.  
 The correlation matrix indicates high correlation between the aggregate index and its 
components. The components display low correlation between themselves (with the 
exception of board and disclosure sub-indices). Thus we are assured that the components of 
corporate governance computed assess the different aspects of corporate governance and do 
not cause serious measurement problems.  
 We provide descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for selected variables in 
Table 2.  The dependant variables used in our study are standard deviation of monthly raw 
and market-adjusted returns.  These variables measure the risk of the firm.  The mean 
standard deviation of monthly raw return (Raw_SD) is 0.10. The other dependent variable, 
standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted return (Adj_SD) is also 0.10.  The mean 
standard deviation of monthly market return (Mkt_SD) is 0.04.  The mean return on assets is 
-0.33. The average leverage is 1.39 for our sample firms.  The average market capitalization 
of our sample firms is NZ$391.71 million. The average age of our sample firms is 11.63 
years.  As expected there is very high correlation between our dependent variables -   
standard deviation of monthly raw return and standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted 
returns (0.98).  The correlation matrix indicates few cases of high correlation with the 
exception of 0.85 between leverage (Lev) and market-to-book ratio (M/B).  Interestingly, 
both the dependent variables have low correlation with the aggregate corporate governance 
index.   
3.2 Methodology  
We conduct panel data regressions using standard deviation of monthly raw and market-
adjusted returns as dependent variables and corporate governance measures described in the 
previous section as independent variables.  We follow Cheng (2008) in our choice of a 
suitable measure for risk at the firm level.  We also include a number of control variables 
such as  standard deviation of monthly market returns, Return on Assets (ROA), leverage 
(Lev), Market-to-Book Ratio (M/B), Size, and Age.  We follow the work of Klein et al. 
(2005) and Black et al. (2003) in choosing our control variables. As such, our control 
variables capture the potential impact of profitability, growth potential, leverage and size on 
riskiness of the firm.  Thus the impact of corporate governance on risk may be measured after 
controlling for other factors which have a bearing on the riskiness of the firm.   
4.0 Empirical Results   
Our empirical results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  In Table 3, the standard deviation of 
monthly raw returns are regressed on corporate governance variable (s) and control variables. 
The aggregate corporate governance index (CGI) is not significant at conventional levels.  
We can therefore conclude that corporate governance measured in aggregate terms does not 
affect the riskiness of a firm.  Firm level risk is positively related to market risk (Mkt_SD) 
and growth but negatively related to profitability and size.  
 We then replace CGI with its components – Board Composition (Board), 
Compensation Policy (COMP), Shareholder Rights (Rights) and Disclosure policy (DISC) 
using them one at a time.  Board composition has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on riskiness.  This result indicates that autonomous boards reduce the risk of the firm.  
Shareholder rights also has a negative and significant impact on risk.  When shareholder 
rights are well-protected and managers are not unduly compensated at the expense of 
shareholders, firms tend to become less risky, ceteris paribus.  The other governance 
variables – Compensation Policy and Disclosure Policy do not have a significant impact on 
risk.  
 In Table 4, we regress standard deviation of market-adjusted monthly returns on 
corporate governance measures and other control variables. As before, the overall measure, 
CGI, has no impact on risk.  The Board, Rights and Disclosure sub-indices have significant 
negative impacts on the level of risk.  Our control variables have similar impacts as in Table 
3.  
 Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms with independent boards 
that protect its shareholders’ rights and discloses its governance related policies experience 
lower firm-level risk, other things being equal.        
5.0 Conclusion 
Few studies have examined the impact of corporate governance on risk. Cheng (2008) finds 
that board size is negatively related to the variability of monthly stock returns, annual 
accounting return on  assets, Tobin’s Q, accounting accruals, extraordinary items, analyst 
forecast inaccuracy, the level of R&D expenditures, and the frequency of acquisition and 
restructuring activities. Board size is but one aspect of corporate governance. We argue that 
other aspects of corporate governance such as board composition, shareholder rights policy 
and disclosure practices should have a significant impact on the riskiness of the firm.  We 
therefore extend the work of Cheng (2008) by constructing a comprehensive index of firm 
level corporate governance for New Zealand firms and relate it to the risk of a firm’s stock 
return.  
Our empirical results based on 385 firm years shows that the aggregate measure of 
corporate governance does not significantly influence the risk of a firm.  However, sub-
indices based on board composition, shareholder rights, and disclosure policy have a 
significantly negatively influence on risk.  Our contribution to the emerging literature on the 
impact of corporate governance on risk is two-fold. First, we demonstrate that corporate 
governance features significantly impact risk at the firm level. Second, we show that not all 
features of corporate governance have a bearing on risk.  Specifically, firms with independent 
boards, that protect its shareholders’ rights and discloses its governance related policies 
experience lower firm-level risk, other things being equal.        
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Table 1: Means and correlation matrices, governance indices 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Correlation Coefficients 
CGI          Board         Comp        Rights          Disc 
 
CGI                     65.40            10.07         1.00           
Board                21.55              7.95          0.69         1.00 
Comp                12.65              3.34          0.48         0.19           1.00 
Rights                19.44              1.38         0.75         0.29           0.29            1.00 
Disc                    11.76              2.59         0.59         0.40           0.23            0.33          1.00 
 
Table 2: Means and correlation matrices, selected variables  
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Correlation Coefficients 
Raw_SD   Adj_SD   Mkt_SD    ROA   Lev     M/B   Size   Age  CGI                   
 
Raw_SD             0.10              0.07           1.00           
Adj_SD               0.10              0.07           0.98           1.00 
Mkt_SD              0.04              0.01          0.18            0.18         1.00 
ROA                   -0.33              5.02         -0.20          -0.22         0.04       1.00 
Lev                      1.39              3.54          0.31           0.32          0.06       0.09    1.00 
M/B                    2.47              6.26          0.27           0.27          0.01       0.24    0.85    1.00 
Size                 391.71        1177.51       -0.41          -0.45          0.01       0.20    0.00    0.10  1.00 
Age                   11.63            11.44        -0.01          -0.03          0.10      0.07     0.14   0.15   0.18  1.00 
CGI                   65.40            10.07        -0.10          -0.12           0.16      0.03   -0.02   0.01   0.44  0.05  1.00 
 
Table 3: Standard deviation of monthly raw returns and corporate governance components   
            
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
CGI -0.07 _ 
   
 
(-1.48) 
    Board _ -0.03 
   
  
(-2.11) 
   COMP _ _ -0.01 
  
   
(-0.38) 
  Rights _ _ _ -0.21 
 
    
(-2.51) 
 
DISC _ _ _ _ 
-0.05 
(-1.71) 
      Mkt_SD 1.33 1.36 1.29 1.29 1.31 
 
(4.47) (4.59) (4.33) (4.38) (4.44) 
ROA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-7.92) (-8.06) (-7.81) (-7.86) (-7.66) 
LEV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.21) (0.10) (0.31) (-0.13) (0.45) 
M/B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(2.87) (3.12) (2.81) (3.22) (2.49) 
Size -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(-9.68) (-9.87) (-10.92) (-11.09) (-8.38) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.05) 
Intercept 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.51 0.27 
 
(4.64) (10.65) (7.47) (4.65) (9.37) 
Adjusted R2 0.4335 0.4368 0.4304 0.4395 0.4345 
            
Table 4: Standard deviation of market adjusted monthly returns and corporate governance 
components 
            
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
CGI -0.07 _ 
   
 
(-1.70) 
    Board _ -0.03 
   
  
(-2.03) 
   COMP _ _ -0.02 
  
   
(-1.07) 
  Rights _ _ _ -0.16 
 
    
(-2.06) 
 DISC _ _ _ _ -0.06 
     
(-2.04) 
ROA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-8.27) (-8.38) (-8.13) (-8.18) (-7.97) 
LEV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.54) (0.26) (0.67) (0.27) (0.81) 
M/B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(2.56) (2.79) (2.48) (2.84) (2.12) 
Size -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(-11.36) (-11.70) (-12.84) (-12.90) (-9.79) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-0.08) (-0.08) (0.28) (0.14) (0.12) 
Intercept 0.43 0.27 0.34 0.53 0.35 
 
(6.04) (10.65) (11.49) (5.01) (13.63) 
Adjusted R2 0.4645 0.4663 0.4620 0.4664 0.4663 
            
 
